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Abstract 
A large part of the controversy surrounding the publication of DSM-5 stems from the possibility 
of replacing the purely descriptive approach to classification favored by the DSM since 1980. 
This paper examines the question of how mental disorders should be classified, focusing on the 
issue of whether the DSM should adopt a purely descriptive or theoretical approach. I argue that 
the DSM should replace its purely descriptive approach with a theoretical approach that 
integrates causal information into the DSM’s descriptive diagnostic categories. The paper 
proceeds in three sections. In the first section, I examine the goals (viz., guiding treatment, 
facilitating research, and improving communication) associated with the DSM’s purely 
descriptive approach. In the second section, I suggest that the DSM’s purely descriptive 
approach is best suited for improving communication among mental health professionals; 
however, theoretical approaches would be superior for purposes of treatment and research. In the 
third section, I outline steps required to move the DSM towards a hybrid system of classification 
that can accommodate the benefits of descriptive and theoretical approaches, and I discuss how 
the DSM’s descriptive categories could be revised to incorporate theoretical information 
regarding the causes of disorders. I argue that the DSM should reconceive of its goals more 
narrowly such that it functions primarily as an epistemic hub that mediates among various 
contexts of use in which definitions of mental disorders appear. My analysis emphasizes the 
importance of pluralism as a methodological means for avoiding theoretical dogmatism and 





KEYWORDS: Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders; psychiatric 




The question of whether mental disorders should be classified in a theoretical or purely 
descriptive manner is a philosophical issue embedded in the history of the Diagnostic and 
Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM). In the first two editions of the DSM (APA 1952, 
1968), mental disorders were classified theoretically insofar as diagnostic categories reflected 
central distinctions of psychoanalysis (e.g., the distinction between neurosis and psychosis) and 
disorders were distinguished in terms of biological (‘organic’) and psychological (‘functional’) 
causes (see Tsou 2011). The publication of DSM-III (APA 1980) marked psychiatry’s first 
revolution in psychiatric classification insofar as the DSM-III taskforce, chaired by Robert L. 
Spitzer, self-consciously replaced the psychoanalytic and etiological approach to classification 
adopted in DSM-I and DSM-II with a purely descriptive (“neo-Kraepelinian”) approach that 
made no theoretical assumptions about the causes of mental disorders.1 The purely descriptive 
approach to classification championed by the DSM since DSM-III has recently been brought into 
question with the publication of DSM-5.  
Prior to the publication of DSM-5, there were some indications that DSM-5 would mark 
psychiatry’s second revolution in classification by ushering a paradigm shift away from the 
DSM’s purely descriptive approach. In particular, some reports from the DSM-5 taskforce, 
chaired by David J. Kupfer, indicated that DSM-5 would move the DSM away from the neo-
Kraepelinian approach towards a theoretical and etiological approach to psychiatric classification 
informed by sciences such as genetics and neuroscience (e.g., see Kupfer, First, & Regier 2002; 
Hyman 2007; Regier 2008; Regier, Narrow, Kuhl, & Kupfer 2009; Kupfer & Regier 2011; 
Kupfer, Kuhl, & Regier 2013, p. E2). In articulating a research agenda for DSM-5, Kupfer, First, 
and Regier (2002) contend that: 
[L]imitations in the current [neo-Kraepelinian] diagnostic paradigm suggest that research 
exclusively focused on refining the DSM-defined syndromes may never be successful in 
uncovering their underlying etiologies. For that to happen, an as yet unknown paradigm 
shift may need to occur. . .  [An] important goal . . . is to transcend the limitations of the 
current DSM paradigm and to encourage a research agenda that goes beyond our 
                                                            
1 For a more comprehensive discussion of the neo-Kraepelinian outlook of DSM-III, see Klerman (1978), Blashfield 
(1984), Wilson (1993), Compton & Guze (1995), Mayes & Horwitz (2005), Decker (2007, 2013), and Tsou (2011). 
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current ways of thinking to attempt to integrate information from a wide variety of 
sources and technologies. (p. xix, emphasis added) 
The publication of DSM-5 (APA 2013) would be disappointing to those who expected revisions 
of paradigm-shifting proportions. The main difference in DSM-5, compared to DSM-IV-TR 
(APA 2000), is the greater use of dimensional measures. Nonetheless, the recent publication of 
DSM-5 occasions a reconsideration of the prospects of theoretical versus purely descriptive 
approaches to psychiatric classification. 
 The aim of this paper is to critically evaluate the relative merits of purely descriptive and 
theoretical approaches to psychiatric classification for meeting the DSM’s goals of providing a 
manual that can guide treatment, facilitate research, and improve communication. I argue that the 
DSM’s purely descriptive approach is impoverished for meeting these aims and would benefit by 
shifting towards a theoretical system that integrated information about the causes of mental 
disorders into its descriptive categories. The paper proceeds as follows. In section 2, I discuss the 
aims associated with the purely descriptive approach to classification adopted since DSM-III. In 
section 3, I compare the relative benefits and costs of purely descriptive versus theoretical 
approaches for meeting these aims. I argue that descriptive approaches are best suited for 
coordinating communication among mental health professionals; however, theoretical 
approaches are better suited for meeting the DSM’s goals of facilitating research and treatment. 
In section 4, I argue that the DSM should adopt a hybrid model that integrates the benefits of 
descriptive and theoretical approaches. In articulating this argument, I suggest that the DSM 
ought to narrow its goals, such that it functions primarily as an epistemic hub, i.e., a reference 
point that can mediate among the various contexts in which definitions of mental disorders 
appear (Kutschenko 2011). To be a useful epistemic hub, I suggest that the DSM should classify 
mental disorders that are natural kinds (i.e., kinds associated with a distinctive biological causal 
structure) and its diagnostic categories should be informed by the best available theories on the 
biological causes of mental disorders. With respect to how the DSM could integrate causal 
theories into its descriptive categories, my argument emphasizes the importance of pluralism as a 
means to ensure that the DSM is informed by a multiplicity of, sometimes conflicting, scientific 




2. Aims of the DSM  
The aims of the DSM are ambiguous and multifaceted because they have been historically 
shaped by a variety of social forces, such as the US healthcare system, the pharmaceutical 
industry, and various lobbyist groups (see Cooper 2005; Tsou 2011; Sadler 2013). In the late 
1970s, when DSM-III was being drafted, psychiatry (i.e., psychoanalytically oriented psychiatry) 
was in a state of crisis and the American Psychiatric Association (APA) was facing pressure to 
revise the DSM so it would provide clear and reliable diagnostic categories for purposes of 
medical insurance reimbursement (Tsou 2011). Moreover, the emergence of pharmacological 
drugs (e.g., antipsychotic drugs) in the 1950s and 1960s that could treat the symptoms of more 
severe mental disorders created a need for reliable diagnostic categories to ensure that patients 
were properly diagnosed before receiving pharmacological treatment. DSM-III addressed these 
practical problems by providing a manual with clear and reliable diagnostic classifications and 
introducing the now familiar diagnostic criteria that demand that a set of operationalized 
necessary and sufficient criteria (mainly behavioral criteria) be satisfied for a diagnosis to be 
made.  
In the introduction to DSM-III, the purely descriptive approach to classification is 
justified in terms of its capacity to facilitate widespread use of the manual by clinicians of 
diverse theoretical orientations:  
The approach taken in DSM-III is atheoretical with regard to etiology . . . except 
for those disorders for which this is well established . . . The major justification 
for the generally atheoretical approach . . . is that the inclusion of etiological 
theories would be an obstacle to use of the manual by clinicians of varying 
theoretical orientations . . . Because DSM-III is generally atheoretical with 
regard to etiology, it attempts to describe comprehensively what the manifestations 
of the mental disorders are, and only rarely attempts to account for how the disturbances 
come about . . . This approach can be said to be “descriptive” in that the definitions of the 
disorders generally consist of descriptions of the clinical features of the disorders. . . . at 
the lowest order of inference necessary to describe the characteristic features of the 




As alluded to in this passage, one of the chief motivations for adopting a descriptive and 
atheoretical approach was to remove speculative psychoanalytic theoretical assumptions that 
typified DSM-I and DSM-II. Consequently, the shift to a neo-Kraepelinian approach in DSM-III 
allowed mental health professionals with diverse theoretical orientations to utilize the DSM. In 
this regard, it is no accident that the DSM only became a highly influential, and increasingly 
entrenched, manual after 1980. 
 Besides permitting widespread usage of the manual, the DSM is presented as a manual 
that aims to guide treatment, facilitate research on mental disorders, and improve communication 
among mental health professionals. These goals are stated most explicitly in the introduction to 
DSM-IV-TR as follows: 
Our highest priority has been to provide a helpful guide to clinical practice. We hoped to 
make DSM-IV practical and useful for clinicians by striving for brevity of criteria sets, 
clarity of language, and explicit statements of the constructs embodied in the diagnostic 
criteria. An additional goal was to facilitate research and improve communication among 
clinicians and researchers. (APA 2000, p. xxiii, emphasis added) 
The purpose of DSM-IV is to provide clear descriptions of diagnostic categories in order 
to enable clinicians and investigators to diagnose, communicate about, study, and treat 
people with various disorders. (APA 2000, p. xxxvii, emphasis added) 
As indicated here, the DSM aims to meet three primary goals: (1) to guide clinical treatment by 
providing operational definitions of mental disorders that allow clinicians to diagnose and make 
judgments about what treatment interventions are appropriate, (2) to facilitate research by 
providing standardized definitions that can be utilized in the study of mental disorders, and (3) to 
improve communication among mental health professionals presupposing disparate theoretical 
assumptions (cf. APA 2013, p. xli). 
 Despite its explicit articulation of its goals, the DSM is ambiguous in its intended aims, 
especially with respect to how—and to what extent—the manual is intended to facilitate 
treatment and research. Moreover, I contend that the DSM’s assumption that the various goals 
and uses of the DSM “are compatible with one another” (APA 2000, p. xxviii) is misleading (cf. 
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Frances & Widiger 2012, p. 110). My counter-suggestion is that there are tradeoffs between how 
well descriptive and theoretical manuals can facilitate these various goals.  
 
3. Descriptive vs. Theoretical Approaches to Psychiatric Classification 
Given that the aims of the DSM are to facilitate treatment, research, and communication, what 
are the prospects of purely descriptive versus theoretical approaches for achieving these goals? 
While the DSM’s purely descriptive approach does well at facilitating communication and 
promoting the widespread use of the manual, I argue that a theoretical approach would provide a 
superior method for guiding treatment and research. My argument assumes that the DSM ought 
to classify mental disorders that are natural kinds (as opposed to artificial kinds). 
 
3.1. Descriptive Approaches 
The main virtue of purely descriptive approaches to classification is the facilitation of 
communication among mental health professionals. Purely descriptive approaches achieve this 
end by providing a system of standardized definitions of mental disorders, which can be utilized 
in a variety of contexts, including contexts of research and treatment. A related benefit of the 
DSM’s neo-Kraepelinian approach is that its definitions can be widely used by mental health 
professionals working from a variety of theoretical orientations because the manual makes no 
metaphysical assumptions about the causes of mental disorders. Hence, the main benefits of 
purely descriptive approaches stem from the provision of a common language for 
communicating about mental disorders and the potential of its descriptive categories to be widely 
used. 
 While the DSM does well at facilitating communication and widespread usage, its purely 
descriptive approach is only minimally useful for research and treatment. With respect to 
research, the main disadvantage of the DSM’s descriptive and atheoretical approach is the 
difficulty of testing its diagnostic categories. Since mental disorders are defined behaviorally, 
there is no principled way of determining whether a diagnostic category merits inclusion or 
exclusion in the manual. Moreover, although the authors of the DSM claim that the primary 
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purpose of the DSM is to guide treatment, the DSM’s fine-grained diagnostic categories are only 
minimally useful for guiding treatment decisions. For purposes of treatment, clinicians may find 
some use in broad DSM categories that distinguish depression from anxiety and psychosis; 
however, beyond these broad classificatory distinctions, DSM classifications do little to guide 
treatment interventions that go beyond clinicians’ tacit knowledge (Brown 1987; Kirk & 
Kutchins 1988, 1992, ch. 9; Whooley 2010). Moreover, as is well documented, one of the major 
difficulties with the DSM’s descriptive approach is the high incidence of co-morbid diagnoses 
(Kessler et al. 2005). In the context of actual clinical practices, one of the most useful DSM tools 
is the “not otherwise specified” (NOS) diagnosis, which indicates that a cluster of symptoms do 
not neatly fit any of the DSM’s diagnostic categories, but allows individuals seeking treatment to 
receive a DSM diagnosis for purposes of medical insurance (Hyman 2010, pp. 166-167). Hence, 
rather than functioning as a useful guide that facilitates treatment decisions, the DSM 
functions—in practice—as an administrative constraint that clinicians must satisfy to ensure that 
patients are reimbursed for treatment. 
 
3.2. Theoretical Approaches  
 
Weaknesses of the DSM’s descriptive approach are potential advantages of theoretical 
approaches to classification. The distinguishing feature of theoretical approaches is that its 
diagnostic categories would incorporate information about the causes of disorders.2 My 
argument for a theoretical approach assumes that—as an ideal—the DSM should classify natural 
kinds.3 On this view, some mental disorders (e.g., schizophrenia, depression, bipolar disorder) 
are natural kinds insofar as they are classes of abnormal behavior associated with a distinctive 
biological causal structure. More specifically, some mental disorders are natural kinds 
                                                            
2 It is important to note that theoretical approaches are compatible with descriptive approaches to psychiatric 
classification. Theoretical approaches are only incompatible with the purely descriptive (i.e., atheoretical) approach 
to classification associated with DSM-III (APA 1980). 
3 The question of whether the DSM intends to classify natural kinds is murky (cf. Cooper 2005; Tsou 2011). The 
DSM-III taskforce initially planned to include a statement in the introduction of DSM-III that stated that “mental 
disorders are a subset of medical disorders” (see Spitzer, Sheehy, & Endicott 1977; Spitzer & Endicott 1978), which 
would suggest that the DSM does aim to classify natural kinds (cf. APA 1980, p. 6). However, this statement was 
ultimately not included in DSM-III due to protests from psychologists, social workers, and counselors who regarded 
it as a declaration that psychiatrists—with medical training—were solely responsible for the treatment of mental 
disorders (Mayes & Horowitz 2005).  
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constituted by networks of identifiable biological mechanisms at multiple levels (e.g., molecular, 
developmental, neurobiological) that interact to produce the key features of the kind (see 
Kendler, Zachar, & Craver 2011; Tsou 2012, 2013).4 The significance of this view is that the 
common biological causal structure captured by a natural kind term allows for projectable 
inductive inferences (i.e., predictions) to be made about members of a kind.5 This importantly 
includes inferences about the prognosis of a particular disorder and predictions regarding how an 
individual diagnosed with a disorder will respond to specific treatment interventions. 
  
 Compared to purely descriptive approaches, theoretical approaches would be superior for 
purposes of facilitating research. Currently the DSM guides research in a top-down manner by 
providing operational definitions of disorders, which researchers employ to select homogenous 
populations of patients to study. Given the high inter-rater reliability of DSM categories, this 
strategy is useful for ensuring that researchers working in different locales are studying mental 
disorders in a uniform manner. A fundamental problem with this approach, however, is that 
while the DSM’s diagnostic categories are reliable, its categories lack validity (Kendell 1989; 
Kendell & Jablensky 2003).6 A theoretical approach to classification could individuate disorders 
by etiology, rather than behaviorally, which would provide a more effective method for 
identifying valid diagnostic categories. As Dominic Murphy (2006) has argued, the DSM’s 
purely descriptive approach offers an incoherent methodology for psychiatric classification 
insofar as it “requires us to assume that a significant difference can exist between individuals at 
the level of surface symptoms that does not reflect an underlying causal difference” (p. 324). 
From this perspective, the DSM’s purely descriptive approach is highly costly insofar as the 
                                                            
4 I assume that mechanisms are complex systems of entities and activities that are organized in a way to produce 
regular changes (see Bechtel & Richardson, 1993; Glennan, 1996, 2002; Machamer, Darden, & Craver, 2000; 
Craver & Darden, 2001; Machamer, 2004; Tabery, 2004).  
5 For discussion of the projectability of natural kind terms, see Quine (1969), Goodman (1983), Boyd (1985, 1999, 
2010), and Khalidi (2013).  
6 While there is no agreed upon concept of validity in psychiatry, valid diagnostic categories are generally 
understood as classifications that pick out real natural phenomena, i.e., categories that ‘carve nature at the joints.’ 
For a more comprehensive discussion of various proposed definitions of validity (e.g., construct and content 
validity), see Robins & Guze (1970), Kendler (1990), Kendell & Jablenksy (2003), First et al. (2004), Murphy 
(2006, ch. 6), Jablensky (2012), and Shaffner (2012). While some theorists have argued that validity is best 
understood in terms of utility, I assume that these concepts are distinct, although it is important to recognize that 
valid diagnostic categories will be predictively useful (i.e., projectable), but not necessarily vice versa. Given the 
importance of making reliable predictions in psychiatry (and the difficulty in evaluating more general ideals of 
validity), predictive validity is arguably the most useful concept of validity to employ in evaluating diagnostic 
categories (Shaffner 2012).  
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manual functions—in practice—to reify and promote research on mental disorders (e.g., 
histrionic personality disorder, mathematics learning disorder) that may have no natural basis 
(Hyman 2010).  
 Theoretical approaches could also benefit research by providing a potentially testable and 
correctable system of psychiatric classification. The testability of theoretical approaches is an 
issue discussed by Carl Hempel in his classic analysis of psychiatric taxonomy (Hempel 1965).7 
Hempel (1965) argues that: 
[T]o be scientifically useful a concept must lend itself to the formulation of general laws 
or theoretical principles which reflect uniformities in the subject matter under study, and 
which thus provides a basis for explanation, prediction, and generally scientific 
understanding. This aspect of a set of scientific concepts will be called its systematic 
import, for it represents the contribution concepts make to the systematization of 
knowledge in the given field by means of laws or theories. (p. 146, emphasis added) 
According to Hempel, scientific classification systems follow a regular progression. Initially, 
classification systems will aim to simply describe objects of classification with the aid of 
operational definitions. However, as the system evolves, it ought to develop into a theoretical 
system where increased emphasis is placed on “the attainment of comprehensive theoretical 
accounts of the empirical subject matter under discussion” (Hempel 1965, p. 140). In arguing for 
a theoretical system of psychiatric classification, Hempel suggests that psychiatric classification 
could resemble other taxonomic systems in science, such as classification systems in chemistry 
and biology (Hempel 1965, pp. 147-149; cf. Hacking 2013). Importantly, a theoretical system of 
classification could make predictions and be testable in ways that purely descriptive systems are 
not.  
The potential testability of theoretical approaches is an issue that the DSM-5 taskforce 
emphasize in their own arguments for a shift away from the DSM’s neo-Kraepelinian approach. 
Regier, Narrow, Kuhl, and Kupfer (2009) write: 
                                                            
7 For a more comprehensive discussion of Hempel’s analysis, see Schwartz & Wiggins (1986), Murphy (2006, ch. 
6), Bolton (2008), and Tsou (2011). Some authors have suggested that Hempel’s paper played an influential 
historical role in DSM-III’s adoption of an operationalized and purely-descriptive approach (e.g., see Bolton 2008, 
p. 3). In this paper, I argue that Hempel’s emphasis on the testability of theoretical taxonomic systems offers 
compelling support for contemporary arguments in favor of theoretical approaches to psychiatric classification. 
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Mental disorder syndromes will eventually be redefined to reflect more useful diagnostic 
categories (‘to carve nature at its joints’) . . . [O]ur immediate task is to set up a 
framework for an evolution of our diagnostic system that can advance our clinical 
practice and facilitate ongoing testing of the diagnostic criteria that are intended to be 
scientific hypotheses, rather than inerrant Biblical scripture. (pp. 648-649, emphasis 
added) 
Implicit in this statement is the idea that the DSM can advance to a theoretical and etiological 
system better suited for testing the validity of diagnostic categories. The DSM’s atheoretical and 
purely descriptive orientation, by contrast, has functioned in practice to protect its diagnostic 
categories from revision given that—without appeals to etiology—there is no systematic way of 
determining when a disorder should be retained, revised, or removed from the manual. This 
aspect of the DSM has led to a trend of proliferation of diagnostic categories since the 
publication of DSM-III, which some authors have regarded as a sign of scientific degeneration 
(e.g., see Follette & Houts 1996; Houts & Follette 1998; Houts 2001; Horwitz 2002; cf. 
Wakefield 1998, 1999, 2001). 
 A theoretical approach to classification would also be beneficial for providing a manual 
that guides treatment decisions. As argued above, an advantage of theoretical approaches is that 
they could individuate mental disorders on the basis of shared biological regularities. This would 
ensure that the DSM’s diagnostic categories are projectable in the sense that clinicians can make 
successful inductive inferences about treatment. Without a clear theoretical basis for the DSM’s 
diagnostic categories, there is no assurance that the DSM’s behavioral definitions are projectable. 
Paul Meehl (1995) has criticized the DSM on these grounds, arguing that: 
The advance-science medical model does not identify disease taxa with the operationally 
defined syndrome: the syndrome is taken as evidentiary, not as definitory. The explicit 
definition of a disease entity in non-psychiatric medicine is a conjunction of pathology 
and etiology and therefore applies to patients who are asymptomatic (which is why, e.g., 
one can have a silent brain tumor. . . ). Perhaps we cannot blame psychologists ignorant 
of medicine for making this mistake, when some psychiatrists who are passionate 
defenders of the DSM don’t understand how far it deviates from the optimal medical 
model. (p. 267) 
11 
 
As Meehl argues, psychiatric treatment would be better served by a theoretical and etiological 
approach to classification because it would incorporate information about the causes of disorders 
(also see Murphy 2006, pp. 324-326). 
The main disadvantage of theoretical approaches is the potential compromise of the 
facilitation of communication and widespread usage of the DSM. Because the etiology of many 
mental disorders is unknown, theoretical approaches run the risk of introducing the kinds of 
speculative causal inferences that the authors of DSM-III sought to remove. However, while the 
shift to an atheoretical approach in DSM-III (APA 1980)—in the historical context of the 
1970s—was justified because it helped to remove speculative psychoanalytic theories from the 
DSM, in our current situation, DSM’s atheoretical stance has served to isolate the manual from 
the most promising scientific theories on psychopathology, including genetics, neurobiology, and 
the cognitive sciences (Murphy 2006, ch. 9; Hyman 2008; Insel et al. 2010; Sanislow et al. 
2010). This criticism is particularly salient given that one of the intended roles of the DSM is to 
reflect the best current scientific findings on psychopathology. Moreover, a fundamental 
pragmatic difficulty with theoretical approaches is that it is difficult to accommodate different 
sciences. As Rachel Cooper (2005, ch. 3) has pointed out, a psychiatric classification system is 
only as good as the theory it is based on. From this perspective, a disadvantage of theoretical 
approaches to classification stems from the difficulty of choosing which theoretical sciences 
ought to be incorporated into a system of classification and the potential for excluding and 
marginalizing certain scientific theories. In the following section, I defend a hybrid approach to 
classification that recommends that the DSM’s diagnostic categories are informed by the best 
available theories on the biological causes of disorders, while considering a plurality of 
competing theories. Compared to purely descriptive approaches, this (theoretical) hybrid 
approach would present an explicit basis for testing diagnostic categories and provide a more 
promising method for formulating valid diagnostic categories. 
 
4. DSM-5 and Beyond: Steps towards a Theoretical Approach to Classification 
In what follows, I argue that the DSM ought to shift to a theoretical approach to classifying 
mental disorders and offer some recommendations for meeting this ideal. The theoretical 
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approach that I advocate primarily seeks to integrate theoretical information about the causes of 
mental disorders into the DSM’s descriptive diagnostic categories (see note 2). This hybrid 
approach to psychiatric classification could accommodate the benefits of descriptive approaches 
(i.e., facilitating communication) and theoretical approaches (i.e., facilitating treatment and 
research), while avoiding the costs of both.  
 
4.1. The DSM as an Epistemic Hub 
One of the problems with the DSM is the ambitiousness of its aims. While the DSM aims to 
provide a manual that can simultaneously guide treatment, facilitate research, and improve 
communication, this stance fails to recognize that these aims will often conflict and that there are 
tradeoffs between how well descriptive and theoretical approaches can meet these goals. As a 
result, the DSM’s purely descriptive approach has done well at improving communication 
among mental health professionals, but has only yielded minimal benefits for guiding treatment 
and facilitating research. 
One way that the DSM could address this problem is to reconceive its aims in a more 
narrow manner. Rather than serving as a manual that is intended to guide treatment, facilitate 
research, and improve communication (with the facilitation of treatment regarded as its primary 
goal), the DSM should be reconceived as what Lara K. Keuck has called an epistemic 
hub (Kutschenko, 2011). Keuck argues that broadly applied medical classification systems that 
are used in different settings by a variety of actors—such as the DSM—ought to serve primarily 
as hubs that can mediate between these various practices (cf. Pincus 2012, pp. 157-158). In this 
manner, epistemic hubs are reference points that allow for the exchange of information and the 
integration of explanations among researchers, practicing clinicians, and other mental health 
professionals. As Keuck points out, because epistemic hubs are intended for widespread use in 
different contexts, they ought to primarily strive for connectivity with alternative descriptions of 
disorders, rather than precision per se. While the DSM does not represent an ideal epistemic hub 
because its diagnostic categories are defined at a level of precision unnecessary for purposes of 
coordinating various practices, the descriptive diagnostic categories of the DSM are well-suited 
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for meeting the goal of providing a common point of reference that can coordinate among the 
various practices of mental health professionals.8   
While I have argued that the DSM should be reconceived as an epistemic hub that 
facilitates communication, to be a useful epistemic hub that genuinely facilitates the exchange of 
information and integration of explanations, the DSM needs to provide definitions for valid 
diagnostic categories. If this requirement is met, then the DSM could more effectively meet its 
goals of providing a manual that is useful for guiding treatment and facilitating research. Without 
the provision of validated diagnostic categories, a high cost of the DSM is the potential 
reification of artificial kinds (e.g., narcissistic personality disorder, histrionic personality 
disorder), which have pernicious implications for both treatment and research.9 As argued in 
section 3 of this paper, the DSM ought to individuate and classify natural kinds associated with 
an identifiable biological basis, which would ensure that the DSM’s diagnostic categories are 
projectable in the sense of yielding successful inductive inferences about members of a kind. In 
her analysis, Keuck downplays the importance of issues concerning validity, suggesting that 
epistemic hubs “cannot and should not be considered scientific taxonomies in Hempel’s sense” 
(Kutschenko 2011, p. 585). Against this view, I maintain that in addition to functioning as an 
epistemic hub that facilitates communication, the DSM should also strive to provide validated 
diagnostic categories that are useful in contexts of treatment and research.10 For this goal to be 
met, the DSM’s diagnostic categories ought to incorporate theoretical information about the 
causes of disorders. 
 
                                                            
8 For this purpose, the dimensional measures introduced in DSM-5 (APA 2013) may be disadvantageous because 
they import an unnecessary level of specificity into definitions of mental disorders. 
9 In the human sciences, I assume that artificial kinds are classes that are useful for distinguishing a socially relevant 
group (e.g., ‘liberals,’ ‘widows,’ ‘police officers’), but are not associated with a distinctive biological causal 
structure (see Tsou 2013). Some clear examples of artificial kinds listed in DSM-5 include histrionic personality 
disorder, dependent personality disorder, and voyeuristic disorder. There is meager evidence that the characteristic 
signs of these disorders are caused by identifiable biological mechanisms, and any biological regularities observed 
for these disorders are better accounted for at a more general level of analysis (e.g., in terms of anxiety or high 
testosterone levels). 
10 Keuck suggests that epistemic hubs and Hempelian scientific taxonomies are different insofar as “the latter strive 
for precision, whereas as the former need to uphold a certain degree of fuzziness in their descriptions . . . in order to 
allow different actors to connect their more restrictive classification systems to the epistemic hub” (Kutschenko 
2011, p. 585). However, there is no principled reason why the diagnostic categories of scientific taxonomies cannot 
be formulated at the level of generality required to serve as an epistemic hub.  
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4.2. The Integration of Causal Information 
If the DSM is understood as an epistemic hub that serves primarily to mediate between different 
contexts of use in which definitions of mental disorders occur, should the DSM adopt a purely 
descriptive (atheroretical) or theoretical approach? According to the analysis of this paper, there 
is no question that the DSM should move towards a theoretical approach. The most problematic 
aspect of the DSM’s neo-Kraepelinian approach is the lack of validity of its categories and 
adopting a broadly theoretical approach would provide a more effective means for addressing 
this difficulty. The important question is not whether, but how theoretical information could be 
integrated into the DSM and on what basis its diagnostic categories could be revised.  
 The theoretical approach that I advocate would not necessarily include the causes of 
mental disorders in its diagnostic categories (cf. Hyman 2007); rather, it would incorporate 
information about causes by requiring—as an ideal—that the operational symptoms that 
constitute the diagnostic criteria of a disorder are caused by identifiable biological mechanisms.  
According to this ideal, in order for a disorder to be included in the DSM, there needs to be 
evidence that there is a stable and distinctive biological causal structure for the classified 
disorder. This stance can accommodate the fact that scientists often do not have knowledge of 
the biological causes for many DSM disorders (e.g., bipolar disorder), although they have 
evidence that these disorders possess a distinctive biological causal structure. However, the 
DSM’s diagnostic categories ought to be refined over time such that the characteristic signs that 
define mental disorders are associated with identifiable biological causes.  
As a concrete example of a diagnostic category that possesses some (predictive) validity, 
consider the DSM’s definition of schizophrenia, which requires that two or more of the 
following symptoms must be present over a one-month period (APA 2013, pp. 99-100): 
(1) Delusions 
(2) Hallucinations 
(3) Disorganized speech (e.g., frequent derailment or incoherence) 
(4) Grossly disorganized or catatonic behavior 
(5) Negative symptoms (i.e., diminished emotional expression or avolition) 
At least one of the symptoms present must be (1), (2) or (3) 
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The diagnostic criteria for the DSM’s schizophrenia classification, while not ideal, are useful 
precisely because there are compelling theoretical reasons for thinking that these particular 
symptoms have identifiable causes.11 For example, neurobiological research indicates that 
delusions (1) and hallucinations (2)—the “positive symptoms” of schizophrenia—are caused by 
excessive dopamine activity in the mesolimbic pathway, while “negative symptoms” (5) are 
caused by deficient dopamine activity in the mesocortical pathway (see Tsou 2012). In this 
manner, the DSM’s classification of schizophrenia represents a theoretically informed 
descriptive category. In connection with the ideal of epistemic hubs defended in this paper, the 
level of generality that the schizophrenia classification is described is useful because it can be 
coordinated with more specific descriptions of schizophrenia (e.g., paranoid or catatonic sub-
types). Hyman (2007) suggests that a number of disorders listed in the DSM (e.g., schizophrenia, 
bipolar disorder, major depression, and obsessive-compulsive disorder) possess some validity 
and pick out natural phenomena because there is evidence for the heritability of these disorders 
and striking similarities in the symptoms of these disorders as they appear across cultures (p. 
726).12 These disorders provide paradigm examples of disorders that should be included in the 
DSM, and the diagnostic criteria for these disorders should ideally include symptoms that are 
theorized to be caused by identifiable biological mechanisms.13 
The hybrid approach to classification outlined herein can accommodate the advantages of 
purely descriptive and theoretical approaches. Because this approach would retain the DSM’s 
descriptive approach, it would maintain the DSM’s ability to facilitate communication and 
widespread use of the manual. In terms of the ideal of epistemic hubs defended in this paper, 
                                                            
11 The DSM’s diagnostic criteria for schizophrenia could be improved by including ‘cognitive impairments’ (e.g., 
deficits in attention, memory, and executive functioning), which are theorized to be caused by dopamine dysfunction 
in the prefrontal cortex (Hyman & Fenton 2003). Similarly, I have argued that there are good theoretical reasons for 
including mental inflexibility (“cognitive rigidity”) in the diagnostic criteria for depression because there is evidence 
that this cognitive trait, which is correlated with both depression and suicide ideation, is caused by deficient 
serotonin projections to the orbitofrontal cortex (Tsou 2013). 
12 I have elsewhere discussed the importance of cross-cultural research for helping to identify disorders that are 
natural kinds (Tsou 2007, 2013). On my view, the distinction between natural and artificial kinds is a distinction of a 
degree, and the symptoms of ‘more natural’ disorders (i.e., disorders whose characteristic signs are more directly 
determined by biological mechanisms) will exhibit greater uniformity across cultures (and over time) than artificial 
kinds.  
13 In this connection, more research efforts should be directed towards to validating proposed criterion sets of 
disorders by providing evidence that the cluster of signs included in these sets are caused by biological mechanisms 
(cf. Frances & Widier 2012, pp. 118-120). For this purpose, cross-cultural research is a particularly useful resource 
for identifying the common cluster of symptoms associated with a disorder (see Kleinman 1988, chs. 2-3; Kendler 
2009; Tsou 2007; cf. Cooper 2010).  
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diagnostic criteria should be articulated at a level of generality that allows its categories to be 
compatible with alternative, more specific, descriptions of mental disorders. Integrating 
theoretical information about the causes of mental disorders into these categories, however, 
would provide a more effective method for providing validated diagnostic categories, which 
would be beneficial for guiding clinical treatment and facilitating research.    
 
4.3. Theoretical Pluralism and the Revision of DSM Categories  
As discussed in section 3 of this paper, one of the main disadvantages of theoretical approaches 
is the difficulty of accommodating different, and sometimes incompatible, theories of 
psychopathology. Theoretical pluralism is a promising methodological means for overcoming 
this difficulty. In philosophy of science, proponents of pluralism (e.g., see Feyerabend 1975; 
Suppes 1978; Dupré 1993; Longino 1990, 2001; Mitchell 2003; Giere 2006; Kellert, Longino, & 
Waters 2006) argue that—because of the theory-ladenness of scientific observation (Hanson 
1958; Kuhn 1962)—a plurality of inconsistent, and sometimes mutually incompatible, scientific 
theories are required to obtain an adequate understanding of scientific phenomena. For example, 
Paul Feyerabend (1965) contends that: 
Not only is the description of every single fact dependent on some theory . . . but there  
also exist facts that cannot be unearthed except with the help of alternatives to the  
theory to be tested and that become unavailable as soon as such alternatives are  
excluded. This suggests that the methodological unit to which we must refer when 
discussing questions of test and empirical content is constituted by a whole set of partly  
overlapping, factually adequate, but mutually inconsistent theories . . . it suggests a  
theoretical pluralism as the basis of every test procedure. (p. 175, emphasis in original) 
Feyerabend maintains that if the description of scientific facts is theory-dependent, then there are 
facts relevant to the validity of a theory that cannot be revealed except with alternatives to the 
theory being tested. On this view, theoretical pluralism is virtuous because alternative theories 
can serve as criticisms of currently accepted theories that cannot be obtained in other ways 
(Feyerabend 1965, p. 150).14 With respect to how the DSM’s diagnostic categories should be 
                                                            
14 I have elsewhere discussed the importance of Feyerabend’s views on pluralism (Tsou 2003). 
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revised to incorporate theoretical information, the kind of theoretical pluralism advocated by 
Feyerabend could provide an effective means for avoiding theoretical dogmatism. 
In order for the DSM to incorporate theoretical information about its diagnostic 
categories in a fruitful manner, a plurality of theories should be represented in the DSM revision 
process. Much disgruntlement surrounding the revision of the DSM in the past resulted from the 
exclusion of individuals with divergent theoretical views (Sadler 2005, ch. 3), and the DSM 
would benefit by broadening the theoretical perspectives represented by experts involved in the 
DSM revision process (Frances & Widiger 2012). Similarly, the critical review of proposed 
revisions to the DSM could be improved by soliciting literature reviews from people working 
outside of the DSM revision process, especially from reviewers who are likely to be critical of 
proposals (Widiger & Clark 2000; Frances & Widiger 2012).15 Finally, the ideal of pluralism 
could be better approached in the field testing of proposed criterion sets, which currently is 
limited to pilot studies in artificial research settings (Frances & Widiger 2012). At minimum, 
some field testing should be conducted in clinical settings and criticism of proposed criterion sets 
should come from practicing clinicians adopting diverse theoretical orientations. 
 In addition to pluralism in the DSM revision process, the DSM could benefit from 
pluralism at the taxonomic level (Kutschenko 2011). Given that there are multiple purposes for 
classifying mental disorders, researchers and clinicians should develop alternative classification 
systems that can simultaneously serve to inform (and potentially criticize) the DSM’s diagnostic 
categories. One example of such an alternative is the Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) 
classification system being introduced by the National Institute of Mental Health (NIMH). The 
RDoC is an explicitly theoretical system of classification intended primarily for facilitating 
research.16 While the RDoC was initially formulated as a competing system of classification to 
the DSM—due to dissatisfaction with the lack of validity of DSM diagnostic categories (Insel et 
                                                            
15 While I have argued that disorders included in the DSM should have a clear biological basis, the theories that are 
employed to criticize existing diagnostic categories ought to represent a wide-spectrum of views, including 
psychoanalytic, humanistic, and social psychological perspectives. These alternative perspectives could help to 
clarify which particular symptoms of disorders lack a natural basis and shed light on other mechanisms relevant for 
the expression of disorders.  
16 As indicated in the Research Domain Criteria Matrix (see Morris & Cuthbert 2012, p. 31), the RDoC seeks to 
organize research by distinguishing seven units of analysis (viz., genes, molecules, cells, circuits, physiology, 
behavior, self-reports, and paradigms) and five research domains (viz., negative valence emotional systems, positive 
valence emotional systems, cognitive systems, systems for social processes, and arousal/ regulatory systems). 
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al. 2010)—the NIMH and APA have taken a more collaborative stance recently. The NIMH and 
APA issued a joint press release on May 13, 2013, which stated the following: 
All medical disciplines advance through research progress in characterizing diseases and 
disorders. DSM-5 and RDoC represent complementary, not competing, frameworks for 
this goal. DSM-5 . . . reflects the scientific progress seen since the manual’s last edition 
was published in 1994. RDoC is a new, comprehensive effort to redefine the research 
agenda for mental illness. As research findings begin to emerge from the RDoC effort, 
these findings may be incorporated into future DSM revisions and clinical practice 
guidelines. But this is a long-term undertaking. It will take years to fulfill the promise 
that this research effort represents for transforming the diagnosis and treatment of mental 
disorders. (Insel & Leiberman, 2013, emphasis added) 
This collaborative effort between the APA and NIMH provides an instructive example of how 
the DSM could be coordinated with and informed by alternative classification systems, which 
could help to incorporate theoretical information about the causes of disorders into the DSM’s 
diagnostic categories.17 
  A legitimate worry about adopting a theoretical approach to classification is the 
possibility of theoretical dogmatism. I have suggested that theoretical pluralism provides a 
methodological prescription that could alleviate this problem. Whereas theoretical pluralism is 
the norm within research on psychopathology, the ideal of pluralism is inadequately met in the 
DSM revision process. The DSM could also benefit by being forced to coordinate itself against a 
plurality of more specifically formulated classification systems, such as the RDoC, CFTMEA 
(Misés & Quemada 2002), and OPD (OPD Task Force 2008). Unfortunately, there are few 
alternative psychiatric classification systems that have been formulated for specific purposes 
(e.g., treatment manuals); undoubtedly, part of this problem is due to the current hegemonic 
status of the DSM. However, the development of alternative classification systems might provide 




17 Moreover, the efforts of the RDoC may ultimately serve to drastically revise our understanding of what the proper 
targets of validation are given that the RDoC will explore new ways of classifying mental disorders that do not rely 




In this paper, I argued that the DSM should adopt a theoretical approach to classification that 
incorporates information about the causes of mental disorders. The particular approach that I 
favor retains the DSM’s descriptive categories, but integrates theoretical information about the 
causes of disorders into its categories. This hybrid approach would aim to classify mental 
disorders with a clear natural (biological) basis and ensure that the diagnostic criteria that define 
mental disorders have identifiable (or hypothesized) biological causes. Compared to purely 
descriptive approaches, the main benefits of this approach is that it would: (1) provide a 
methodological basis for formulating valid and projectable diagnostic categories, (2) offer an 
explicit basis for deciding when disorders ought to be included or excluded from the DSM, and 
(3) engage the DSM more closely with a large body of scientific research on psychopathology. 
On a more general level, I suggested that the DSM could usefully be reconceived of as an 
epistemic hub that serves to mediate among various contexts of use in which definitions of 
mental disorders appear. From this perspective, the diagnostic categories of the DSM ought to be 
defined at a level of generality that permits the manual to be coordinated with alternative 
descriptions of mental disorders. 
 While I have characterized the shift towards a theoretical approach to classification as 
psychiatry’s “second revolution,” I envisage this shift as a gradual and iterative process. Kendler 
and First (2010) have urged that the DSM is not ready for a paradigm shift wherein the DSM’s 
purely descriptive approach is jettisoned in favor of an etiological and theoretical approach. 
Others have stressed the importance of conservatism in revising future editions of the DSM 
(Frances & Widiger 2012). I am sympathetic to these concerns, and the ideal of classification 
advanced in this paper can accommodate these worries. Because the theoretical approach that I 
advocate retains the DSM’s descriptive approach to classifying mental disorders, theoretical 
information about the causes of the signs of mental disorders could be incorporated in the DSM’s 
existing diagnostic categories in a gradual and piecemeal fashion. When there is uncertainty 
regarding the validity or causes of a disorder, my favored approach would recommend retaining 
the status quo until there are compelling theoretical reasons for making revisions. Regardless of 
whether the theoretical approach that I advocate would constitute a paradigm-shifting revolution 
in the classification of mental disorders, it would mark a significant point of scientific progress 
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